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6 December 1948

WE COMMENTS ON STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP COMMENT ON ORE 51-48

- I. Paragraph one of the G/SI comment is factually inaccurate. The G/SI directive required answers to two questions: (a) would the USSR unilaterally withdraw from Germany prior to February 1949? and (b) would the USSR suggest a four-power evacuation, in the UNGA or elsewhere?

Direct and seemingly clear answers are given in the opening sentences of the two paragraphs of the conclusions: "Under no circumstances will the USSR withdraw completely from Germany" and "For propaganda purposes the USSR will continue to advocate unofficially quadripartite withdrawal from Germany. It is probable that the Kremlin will make an official proposal for quadripartite evacuation of either Germany as a whole or of Berlin...."

- II. In its directive G/SI required W/E Branch to discuss the "advantages" and "disadvantages" to the USSR from ~~possible~~ Soviet courses of action. In addition, a statement of "consequences" of such action was requested, (See paragraph two of subject directive). [redacted] or G/SI, who wrote the G/SI directive -- without consultation with or consideration of the producing components -- confessed that he was unable to define the difference between advantage, disadvantages and consequences. He agreed that, as far as he could see they were one and the same and that "consequences" did not, therefore, require separate treatment.

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[redacted] was informed, at the time the project was initiated, that the query from Mr. [redacted], and, in particular, the G/SI estimate of what Mr. [redacted] wanted was so narrow an approach to these matters as to result in a dangerous over-simplification. [redacted] was further advised that inasmuch as several men in the Kremlin have absolute power over a Soviet decision, any estimate of Soviet intentions in so intangible and flexible a matter as propaganda and psychological warfare can be couched, at best, only in terms of possibilities or probabilities.

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- III. Finally, attention is invited to the fact that G/SI agreed in conference with representatives of W/E Branch and E/EU Branch that the paper as submitted was satisfactory for its purpose as a draft for discussion and coordination with the other IAG agencies.

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IV. The WE Branch, having conferred with the other participating entities (FNU and IOG), concludes that: (a) the manner in which the project was directed reveals serious confusion in the thinking of the directing unit; G/SI; (b) much of the difficulty which ensued arose from the fact that G/SI did not coordinate the project with the participating entities, as it is required to do, before promulgating it; (c) the final criticism by the G/SI of the paper as produced under the foregoing circumstances was no less contradictory and confused than the original G/SI directive, and as destructive of the time and efforts of the participating entities; and (d) G/SI further obscured the situation by avoiding, pointedly, making clear its dissatisfaction directly to the participating entities.

The WE Branch notes moreover, that G/SI continues to arrogate to itself the right to define what shall be produced in ORE and whether the papers so prepared are satisfactory. So long as this situation prevails, the wasteful and damaging delay and confusion which was experienced in the preparation of subject paper will continue. The basic reasons for this are two: (a) the manifest inability of G/SI to transmit a request without inserting its own cabled "assumptions" (see G/SI outline for [redacted] request); and (b) a degree of misinformation or noninformation on intelligence matters that renders G/SI incapable of forming cogent interpretations of substance. G/SI nevertheless continues to act as an intelligence control staff for the entire ORE with results that are typically illustrated in the present instance.

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